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instead by annihilating them. A third essay, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, con-
tains an illuminating exploration of the relation of generosity to justice, 
framed by a discussion of Jesus’s parable of the laborers in the vineyard. In 
that parable, laborers employed for only a short time are generously paid 
the same as the laborers who worked the full day. Wolterstorff argues that 
this arrangement was not unjust—the full-day laborers were not wronged 
by not receiving additional pay—and that the Aristotelian formula for 
justice in distributions that might yield the conclusion that it was unjust 
is mistaken. Wolterstorff does not pursue the matter, but readers might 
ponder how his conclusions fit with their own views on the distribution 
of divine salvific grace.
The final section of the book, titled “God and Moral Responsibility,” 
contains an unusual pair of essays that address what some lesser-known 
philosophers have said on that topic, fairly loosely construed. The first, 
by Vasil Gluchman, contains reflections on the work of two eighteenth-
century Lutheran theologians, Pavel Jakobei and Augustin Dolezal, who 
held different views on sin and evil. Gluchman mostly surveys their ideas 
and does not include an analysis of which thinker may have been closer to 
the truth. In the second essay, Alicja A. Gescinska explains the later work 
of German philosopher Max Scheler and tries to show its connection to his 
earlier work. One of Scheler’s controversial claims in this later work is that 
we create God rather than the other way around, an apparent departure 
from his earlier views that (unsurprisingly) did not impress his Catholic 
contemporaries. While this essay will be of interest to those familiar with 
Scheler and his style of thinking, Gescinska does more to explain where 
the thinking came from than to render it compelling.
In short, while the final section of the book does not really fit with what 
has come before it, the book as a whole contains a valuable collection of 
essays on an interesting set of topics.
God and Moral Obligation, by C. Stephen Evans. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 199 pages. $99.00 cloth.
MARK C. MURPHY, Georgetown University
Fifteen years have passed since the publication of Robert M. Adams’s Finite 
and Infinite Goods, in which Adams argued for a thoroughgoingly theistic 
account of moral properties.1 One piece of Adams’s account was a divine 
command theory of moral obligation, on which being morally obligatory is 
1Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
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identified with being divinely commanded. In the meantime there have been 
a number of alternative theistic accounts of deontic properties offered, 
and Adams’s views have been subjected to a number of lines of criticism. 
So it is very welcome that an excellent philosopher like C. Stephen Evans 
has taken up Adams’s account of moral obligation, arguing for its indis-
pensability within a theistic ethical framework and for its superiority to 
rival nontheistic accounts.
The structure of Evans’s book is as follows. He first offers a formal ac-
count of moral obligation (chapter 1). He then argues that a certain sort 
of divine command theory (DCT), on which being morally obligatory is 
identified with being divinely commanded, provides a plausible account 
of that explanandum (chapter 2). He attempts to co-opt rather than at-
tack allegedly rival natural law and virtue accounts of moral obligation, 
arguing that there need be no inconsistency between DCT and natural 
law theory (NLT) on one hand and between DCT and virtue ethics on the 
other; indeed, DCT can draw upon resources provided by these views in 
making its position more attractive (chapter 3). He considers and rejects 
some common objections to DCT, some formidable, some knuckleheaded 
(chapter 4), and then considers the respective merits of DCT in compari-
son with not-essentially-theistic theories of moral obligation (chapter 5). 
He concludes by considering why we ought not to be skeptics about moral 
obligation, and argues that the reality of moral obligation and the superi-
ority of DCT as an account of moral obligation provides part of a cumula-
tive case argument for God’s existence (chapter 6). I describe some parts of 
this argument in more detail below. There is a massive amount that is of 
interest and worthy of discussion, so my treatment will be selective, focus-
ing on Evans’s accounts of the best formulation of DCT, the relationship of 
NLT to DCT, and the role of accountability in the defense of DCT.
There are, on Evans’s view, objective facts about moral obligation (29). 
Evans takes the fact that some action is morally obligatory to be an all-
or-nothing affair (12–13) that characteristically closes deliberation about 
whether to perform that action (13). In contrast to other sorts of obligations, 
they “hold for persons as persons” (14), giving persons generally compel-
ling reasons to comply (29) that are characteristically motivating (30). So 
far, this analysis of moral obligation is consistent with a view like Joseph 
Raz’s, on which to be obligatory is simply to give a certain sort of reason for 
action.2 Evans takes it, though, following Adams on one hand3 and Stephen 
Darwall4 on another, that obligation involves the further notion of account-
ability: to fail with respect to an obligation is to render oneself accountable 
to some other party (14).
2See, for example, Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 1979), 235.
3Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 233.
4Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Har-
vard University Press, 2006), 93.
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Evans judges that DCT is at least a plausible candidate for an account 
of moral obligation, where an account of moral obligation tells us why 
it is that an act that is morally obligatory exhibits all of these features. 
That God commands something is an objective matter of fact (30), and it 
is clear that the fact that God commands something will be reason-giving 
and typically motivating, so long as we take the establishing of a proper 
relationship with God to be an essential part of our final good (31). Evans 
notes, rightly, that such a view of moral obligation does not entail that God 
has any discretion at all about what God commands; it is compatible with 
DCT that what God commands is a matter of necessity. What is essential to 
DCT, rather, is that the status of norms as morally obligatory depends on 
the presence of a divine command; as the issue of dependence is distinct 
from the issue of modality, it is just a mistake to conflate them (32–37). 
Evans also judges that a defender of DCT can have a very expansive view 
on the sources of knowledge available concerning what is morally obliga-
tory (37–45). Evans thinks that, understood in this way, moral obligations 
are very plausibly explained by a version of DCT.
What is the best way to formulate DCT? By the time Adams wrote Finite 
and Infinite Goods, an intramural dispute had arisen among theological vol-
untarists about whether the best voluntarist account would be framed in 
terms of divine commands or divine willings. Does a moral obligation to 
perform some action depend on God’s having performed a certain illocu-
tionary act, commanding the performance of that action? Or does it instead 
depend on what God wills—that God aims at, or intends, or wants the per-
formance of that action? Each of these views has some initial appeal and 
some strong reasons in its favor. Adams firmly endorses divine command, 
strictly construed.5 Evans departs both from Adams and from defenders 
of the divine will view. He agrees with the divine will defenders against 
Adams that what matters is what God wills; he agrees with Adams against 
divine will defenders that it is absurd to hold that we should be bound to 
adhere to God’s will were it unknowable to us. Evans thus takes a middle 
route, holding that what is relevant for moral obligation is God’s expressed 
will, whether that will is expressed via commands or some other sort of 
speech act (25). I am unconvinced by this move of Evans’s, for if what mat-
ters is that God’s will be knowable, that consideration does not provide 
adequate justification for requiring that the divine will be communicated 
or expressed by God in any way. For there may be ways of knowing God’s 
will other than through God’s expressing it in some way. (Indeed, given 
Evans’s emphasis on the wide-ranging possibilities for coming to know 
our moral obligations on DCT, it seems clear that he is committed to this.) 
If, for example, we know that God is perfectly loving, we may be able to 
know some particular things that God wills for us even without God’s 
expressing that will to us, and I am not sure why we would not take our-
selves to be bound by that will. On the other hand, if simply being able to 
5Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 258–262.
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infer what God wills us to do is sufficient to count as God’s communicating 
God’s will, I do not think that Evans’s view is any different from the divine 
will views from which he purports to distinguish his own view.
Evans considers three types of challenges to his DCT view: challenges 
from natural law theory and virtue theory (especially in their theistic for-
mulations), challenges to DCT on its own terms, and challenges from non-
theistic theories. He is ecumenical with respect to natural law views like 
John Finnis’s and my own and virtue theories like Linda Zagzebski’s: he 
thinks that there is some truth to these rival views, and that they should 
not be seen as opposing DCT but as offering “complementary answers to 
different questions” (53). This is a generous emphasis by Evans, because 
it is pretty clear that many defenders of these views have wanted to give 
some account of moral obligation, and that by Evans’s lights their views 
must be judged failures. So perhaps it is better to think of Evans as salvag-
ing the partial truth in these views, making some use of them: even if, for 
example, natural law theory cannot provide an account of moral obliga-
tion in terms of the goods of practical rationality, it nevertheless can be put 
to work in giving an account of the background theory of the good that 
DCT requires (62–68).
I am not sure that, by his own lights, Evans can make the use of natural 
law theory that he wants to make of it. In order to make the use of it that 
he wants to make, natural law theory would have to be (a) basically sound 
as an account of goods and reasons but (b) inadequate as a theory of moral 
obligation. I am unsure whether Evans has successfully showed DCT su-
perior to natural law theory as an account of moral obligation (68–74), but 
I want to focus on the (a) condition rather than the (b) condition. Evans’s 
criticisms of natural law theory extend past its adequacy as a theory of 
moral obligation and all the way to its theory of the sort of reasons for ac-
tion that human goods give (68–74): natural law views cannot provide an 
acceptable account of the ways in which human goods provide not only 
agent-relative but agent-neutral reasons for action. (Though his insightful 
criticisms are explicitly aimed at my own particular natural law view, he 
thinks these criticisms generalize (73).) If Evans’s criticisms are success-
ful, it seems to me that he undermines natural law theory not only as a 
theory of moral obligation but also as the background normative theory 
that Evans takes DCT to require (62–68).
The final set of questions I want to raise concerns Evans’s argument for 
DCT. These questions concern the role of accountability in Evans’s argu-
ment for DCT. Evans’s initial defense of DCT does not appeal to this ac-
countability relationship, but instead to the reason-giving and motivating 
power of moral obligation (30–32). What we see, if these arguments suc-
ceed, is that we have very good reason to do what God commands us to do; 
indeed, being given a divine command to do something should exclude 
from deliberation alternatives incompatible with the divine command. 
But this cannot be what makes the case for DCT. For Evans points out that 
accountability is essential to obligation. We might reasonably wonder, then, 
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whether the fact that God’s expressed will is reason-giving and motivating 
must bring along with it an accountability to God for failures to appropri-
ately respond to God’s will; and we might reasonably think—Evans gives 
no reason not to believe this—that there are some actions that even apart 
from God’s expressed will are actions that we have decisive reason and 
characteristic motivation not to perform. So Evans must be relying on the 
accountability feature to do a lot of the work of showing that DCT is both 
in itself a plausible account of moral obligation and a feature accounting 
for which makes DCT superior to its rivals.
But it is not clear that we have been given an account of how this ac-
countability is present, that is, how God has the requisite standing to en-
force compliance. This is not to say that such an account could not be 
forthcoming. But I would like to see the precise shape that it will take, 
because the shape that it takes will help to determine the extent to which 
DCT turns out to be an initially plausible account of moral obligation and 
superior to its theistic but nonvoluntarist and nontheistic rivals.
The notion of accountability here is a normative notion. So the claim 
is not, I take it, that one who violates an obligation of some type will be 
successfully made sorry for doing so. The fact that I am powerful and 
everyone is too afraid, and reasonably so, to hold me to account for the 
violation of some norm that I am under does nothing to call into question 
the status of that norm as an obligation. So Evans’s argument cannot be 
that one is under a moral obligation only if one will be in fact successfully 
be held to account for violating it. It is, rather, that it is characteristic that 
there are parties who have standing, who are entitled, to somehow hold 
one to compliance. And that’s what I do not find in Evans’s account. So let 
me press two challenges regarding the role of accountability.
First, a challenge framed comparatively: Evans’s view requires for suc-
cess that the only or best candidate party to have the standing to hold 
agents to account for moral wrongdoing is God. But why might not the 
parties to whom one is accountable often be fellow created rational be-
ings? They are—and I trust that no DCT defender wants to deny this—
often entitled to demand that one comply with various norms. This view 
is obviously available to secular moralists such as Darwall, who appeals to 
the moral community as the party with standing to insist on compliance. 
But a theistic, but nonvoluntarist, ethicist might go further. The imago Dei 
notion, so useful to Evans in helping to support the idea of humans’ bear-
ing intrinsic worth (143–144), can be used to make trouble for his DCT. A 
theistic nonvoluntarist might claim that part of my dignity as a human is 
not only that I can hope that my fellow humans will act rightly with re-
spect to me, but also that I am entitled to demand that they do so. And if I 
and my fellow humans have this entitlement, then why must we appeal to 
God as the sole party whose standing captures the accountability feature 
of moral obligation?
Second, a challenge framed noncomparatively. On the face of things, it 
seems to me that there is a disconnect between the main idea of a DCT—that 
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the norms of moral obligation exist in virtue of God’s commands—and this 
accountability defense of it. If the really distinctive feature of the obligatory 
is the accountability relationship, why must God be cast as the commander 
of moral norms, rather than as simply their enforcer, or guarantor?
This is a very good book with which to think through systematically 
the case for a divine command account of moral obligation. It gathers in 
the most powerful arguments for the divine command account, develops 
them further, and generously and fairly deploys them against a range 
of argumentative opponents. As Evans predicts (vi), I was not moved 
from my antivoluntarism by these arguments. But it did become clearer 
to me where there was room for divine command theorists to develop 
their view in a way that would place real pressure on nonvoluntarist 
accounts.6 
6Thanks to Terence Cuneo for helpful comments on a draft of this review.
Honor For Us: A Philosophical Analysis, Interpretation and Defense, by William 
Lad Sessions. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010. 224 pages. $110.00 
cloth.
JASON DECKER, Carleton College
In the preface to William Lad Sessions’s monograph Honor For Us, he ex-
plains that he is not joining a philosophical conversation, but rather trying 
to start one. Contemporary philosophers haven’t had much to say about 
honor, except in passing. (Perhaps the most notable exception is Anthony 
Appiah’s The Honor Code, which appeared shortly after Sessions’s book.) 
Sessions’s main thesis is that the concept of personal honor, though much 
maligned—and admittedly dangerous—might just have something im-
portant to offer us, both in helping us to understand our social reality, 
and in providing us with an inspiring ideal. Sessions’s book is engag-
ingly written, philosophically interesting, and provocative—and in these 
ways, it does serve as an excellent conversation starter. In other ways, 
however, it could have been more effective at drawing readers into the 
conversation and convincing them that personal honor might be valuable 
“for us.”
Like most contemporary philosophers, I hadn’t thought much about 
the concept of honor before reading Sessions’s book. Indeed, I initially 
felt a bit disoriented and was well into the book before I felt I had a grip 
on what, exactly, Sessions was interested in initiating a discussion about. 
Insofar as I am accustomed to thinking in terms of honor, I usually have 
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